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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The main issue writer examines in this writing is to analyze whether or not dividend policy is a 
determinant to maintain stock values or firm values as a whole.  It is essential that dividend policy is managed 
properly to enhance the satisfaction of the investors at any level of characteristics. At the end, investors are the 
key that determines the stock value movement. Some investors are looking for capital gain and some do care 
about dividend payout.  Thus, the decision of dividend policy becomes crucial. It needs to understand that a 
firm's dividend policy may have effects on shareholder welfare. The answers can be found out by analyzing 
different factors of dividend policy. Taken as a whole, to see if there are other alternatives if dividend policy that 
can maintain or even boost up firm values. Different dividend policy has some upsides and downsides that a 
corporation needs to consider. One of the alternatives that is common and has become a key is stock repurchase 
plan. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
 
Pokok permasalahan yang dibahas pada tulisan ini adalah untuk menganalisis apakah aturan dividen 
menjadi faktor penting untuk mencinptakan nilai saham atau nilai perusahaan yang kuat.  Mengatur aturan 
dividen dengan baik sangat penting untuk meningkatkan nilai kepuasan pemilik saham yang berbeda-beda 
karakter.  Perlu diingat bahwa pemilik saham memiliki peranan yang kuat dalam menentukan pergerakan nilai 
saham; dan beberapa pemilik saham peduli dengan dikeluarkannya dividen yang rutin. Ada juga yang lebih 
peduli dengan kenaikan harga saham.  Oleh karena itu, keputusan dalam pengeluaran dividen mempunyai 
peranan penting. Perlu dipahami bahwa aturan dividen akan mempunyai efek di tingkat kepuasan pemilik 
saham.  Jawabannya bisa diketahui dengan menganalisis beberapa faktor aturan dividen dan juga dengan 
melihat jika ada alternatif untuk mempertahankan atau meningkatkan nilai perusahaan. Beberapa aturan 
dividen memiliki akibat positif dan negatif yang perlu diperhatikan perusahaan. Salah satu alternatif penting 
yang sudah banyak dipakai adalah membeli kembali saham yang sudah beredar di publik oleh perusahaan. 
 
Kata kunci: aturan dividen, faktor aturan dividen, nilai saham, kepuasan investor, kesejahteraan pemegang 
saham 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Questions about whether firms should pay dividends and whether a firm's dividend policy 
affects shareholder welfare have been at an interesting and unresolved controversy among financial 
economists.  While dividends are not that complex, the reasons behind dividend issuance may vary 
and some insights can be inferred in term of its role. There are three different explanations that can be 
examined. (1) Dividends are irrelevant. That is, investors only care about total returns.  Since 
dividends and capital gains are perfect substitutes, investors do not care how the total return is 
allocated between them.  (2) Dividends are effectively taxed at higher rates then capital gains, and, 
therefore, cannot be viewed as perfect substitutes. This suggests that dividend paying firms should 
have lower stock prices.  (3) Dividends may provide investors with information about a firm’s future 
earnings power. For example, large dividend cuts are considered bad news and cause stock prices to 
drop. 
 
Literature Review   
 
The Dividend Irrelevance Issue 
 
The main question that needs to be addressed in this section is whether managers are able to 
affect shareholder welfare through dividend policy. The explanation below will show that, in a world 
without taxes, firm value is not affected by dividend policy. The intuition can be described in the 
following manner. Suppose management has an investment decision to make. Will the investment 
decision affect the amount of dividends a firm pays? Or, will dividend policy determine how much 
capital is available for new investment? If managers view dividends as a binding commitment that 
constrains them from taking all positive NPV projects the answer is yes. By contrast, if managers are 
willing to raise new capital (debt or equity) to fund good projects, the answer is no. As long as 
investment and dividend decisions are independent, dividend policy is irrelevant. The best way to 
illustrate this point may be through a simple numerical and theoretical example. 
 
A Numberical Example.  Consider a firm with the following riskless cash flows (see Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1 a Firm with Riskless Cash Flows 
 
1 2 3
Cash Flows 100 100 265.5
Time
 
 
 
Suppose that cash flows are paid to shareholders as they are earned. If the risk free rate is 10%, the 
stock has a current market price of $373.03. That is, 
 
CFt 100 100 100
(1 + R)t 1.1 1 1.1 2 1.1 3
+ + = 373.03∑P0 = =
 
 
Table 2 describes two alternative dividend payout policies. Which one would you prefer? 
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Table 2 Two Alternative Dividend Payout Policies 
 
1 2 3
Policy 1 150 150 150
Policy 2 50 50 381
Time
 
 
 
The present value of the equity under policies 1 and 2 are: 
Policy 1:    
Dt 150 150 150
(1 + R)t 1.1 1 1.1 2 1.1 3
+ + = 373.03P0 =∑ =
 
and 
Policy 2:    
Dt 50 50 381.5
(1 + R)t 1.1 1 1.1 2 1.1 3
= 373.03P0 =∑ = + +
 
 
Notice that share price is the same under either policy. The next step shows that these policies are 
feasible. Policy 1 requires the firm to borrow money to make a relatively high early dividend payment. 
 
 
Table 3 Policy 1 
 
1 2 3
Cash Flow 100.00    100.00    265.50    
Dividend 150.00    150.00    150.00    
(50.00)    (50.00)    115.50    
Borrowing 50.00     (55.00)    -         
Borrowing -         105.00    (115.50)  
0 0 0
Time
 
 
 
In order to make a relatively high dividend payment in year 3, Policy 2 requires that the firm 
invest excess cash flows. 
 
 
Table 4 Policy 2 
 
1 2 3
Cash Flow 100.00    100.00    265.50    
Dividend 50.00     50.00     381.00    
50.00     50.00     (115.50)  
Investment (50.00)    55.00     -         
Investment -         (105.00)  115.50    
0 0 0
Time
 
 
 
A Theoritical Example. The following is to demonstrate the irrelevance result in a more 
general setting. Suppose the optimal investment decision is I*(1) and the payoff from the prior period's 
investment is NOI(1) (assume that NOI(1) > I*(1)).  If the firm pays a dividend, D(1), such that  
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D(1) <= NOI(1) – I*(1), 
 
the firm can make the optimal investment decision using internally generated funds. If D(1) > NOI(1) 
– I*(1), what are the firm's alternatives? 
 
Alternative 1, it could make a suboptimal investment decision I(1) such that 
 
I(1) = NOI(1) – D(1). 
 
This implies that I(1) < I*(1).  This is clearly undesirable since presumably the firm must pass up 
positive NPV projects in order to make the dividend payment.   
 
Alternative 2, it could borrow the difference in the capital markets by issuing stock, bonds or 
some combination thereof. That is, 
 
NOI(1) + E(1) + B(1) = I*(1) + D(1). 
 
In this scenario, the firm paid the existing shareholders a dividend and used the capital markets to fund 
the short fall. E(1) and D(1) denote the amount of equity and debt financing, respectively. Modigliani 
and Miller argue that, since the firm has made the optimal investment decision, firm value is 
unaffected by the dividend decision and, consequently, dividend policy is irrelevant. That is, the way 
equity cash flows are split between original and new shareholders doesn't affect firm value provided 
the new shares are issued at a fair price.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The Tax Effect Issue 
 
The most obvious place to begin relaxing the Modigliani and Miller assumption is taxes. In 
the US, dividend payments by a corporation are not tax deductible for corporate tax purposes. The 
same is not true for individual tax payers. Historically, dividends have been taxed at higher rates than 
capital gains at the personal level. The tax code changes over time and currently, dividends are taxed 
at the same rate as long-term capital gains. The code still favors long-term capital gains but only to the 
extent that investors can defer recognition until the security is sold. Thus, superficially, the US tax 
code appears to favor a low dividend payout policy. Next is a closer look at how investment income is 
taxed at the individual level. 
 
Dividend Taxation. Dividends paid by domestic corporations (qualified dividends) are taxed at 
a maximum rate of 15%. All other dividends are taxed at ordinary rates. Firms sometimes pay special 
dividends. These dividends typically include a return of capital. The portion that reflects capital is 
non-taxable. A liquidating dividend is an example of a special dividend.  
 
Capital Gains Taxation. The rules that govern capital gains are complicated. The primary 
implications are that short-term capital gains are taxed at ordinary rates, and long-term capital gains 
are taxed at a maximum rate of 15%. Notice that this is the same rate that applies to qualified 
dividends. A security must be held for at least one year to qualify for long-term capital gains. There is 
a complicate set of rules that nets long- and short-term capital gains and losses. If there is a net capital 
loss, investors may offset this amount against ordinary income up to a maximum of $3,000. 
 
Financial economists have investigated a number of possible ways to determine if dividend 
policy affects stock prices. The following approaches can be considered:  price drops on ex-dividend 
days and cross-sectional analysis of stock returns and dividend yields. 
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If an investor buys a stock before the ex-dividend day, she is entitled to receive the dividend.  
If she buys it on the ex-dividend day, she is no longer entitled to the dividend. This leads to the 
prediction that stock prices will drop by the after-tax value of the dividend. If the marginal investor 
has a 23% tax rate, a $1 dividend will cause the stock price to drop by $0.77 on the ex-dividend date. 
 
Surprisingly, Elton and Gruber found that, on average, stock prices dropped by $0.77 on the 
dollar. They also found that stocks with dividend yields exceeding 5% experienced price declines of 
$0.90. For the smallest dividend yields, the price drop was close to 50%. Taken together, this supports 
the investor clientele hypothesis. That is, firms that pay large dividends attract investors in relatively 
low tax brackets, and firms that pay small dividends attract investors in the highest tax brackets. 
 
Unfortunately, other explanations for this result are equally if not more plausible. Kalay 
(1982) argues that the Elton and Gruber findings are consistent with a popular tax arbitrage strategy.  
To see how it works consider a stock that is currently selling for $20 and is about to pay a $1 dividend.  
Traders can buy the stock for $20, receive a dividend of $1.00 and sell the stock the next day for 
$19.23. Because the capital loss from this price drop is fully taxable at the personal income tax rate for 
short-term traders, this transaction results in an after tax gain 
 
Non-taxable institutions use “dividend capture” strategies to exploit tax arbitrage 
opportunities. For example, non-taxable Japanese mutual funds exploited these opportunities to such a 
degree that the price drop was effectively $1, reflecting a marginal tax rate of zero. Japanese mutual 
funds did this for two reasons:  tax arbitrage and dividend distributions. There are regulations in Japan 
that restrict funds from distributing the principal. They are allowed to distribute dividends. A dividend 
capture strategy allows these funds to collect dividends, which can then be distributed to investors. 
 
The Information Content Issue 
 
Management often has significant inside information about a firm's prospects that it cannot (or 
chooses not to) divulge to investors; and the mere possibility of this information gap between 
management and shareholders causes stock prices to be lower than they would be if everyone shared 
the same information. Corporate dividends may be management's most cost effective means of 
overcoming the investor uncertainty resulting from this potential informational asymmetry. By 
periodically and predictably raising the dividend, management effectively binds itself to make a series 
of future payments to stockholders; and this commitment, which is costly in terms of management's 
future flexibility (it is a common understanding how reluctant managers are to cut dividends), provides 
investors with the assurance that management is not sitting on some important piece of negative 
information. 
 
This creates a problem for managers who need to raise funds to finance the optimal 
investment decision. Potential stockholders realize that management has an incentive to issue stock 
when the market currently overvalues it, and defer issuing stock when it is currently undervalued. As a 
result, they will discount what they are willing to pay for the stock so that on average they expect to 
breakeven. This inefficiency implies that management will be unable to raise as much capital as the 
optimal investment policy would indicate. 
 
As a result, the firm's investment decisions and dividend policy are no longer independent.  
Thus, dividend policy can affect firm value.  Once this possibility is introduced, it may be possible to 
find a dividend decision that maximizes firm value. 
 
It has been difficult to establish a direct link between changes in dividend policy and stock 
prices. The reason may be that dividends are discretionary and small changes in dividends do not 
convey much information. The most interesting studies in this area examine market reactions to 
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extreme changes in dividend policy. Healy and Palepu (1988) find that dividend initiators and firms 
paying dividends for the first time in ten years experience positive abnormal returns of 3.9%. Firms 
that omit dividends for the first time in ten years experience negative abnormal returns of 9.5%.  
Dielman and Oppenheimer (1984) examined a sample of firms that cut dividends by more than 25% 
and firms that omitted dividends and found abnormal returns of -7.7% and -8.1% on the 
announcement date. 
 
One of the interesting aspects of the Healy and Palepu study is that they examine the relation 
between dividend changes and future earnings. They find that dividend initiators experience increases 
in earnings in the year prior to, the year of, and two years following a dividend increase. For firms that 
omit dividends, earnings are down in the year prior to the omission but they appear to recover in 
subsequent years. They also find that abnormal stock price reactions are positively correlated with 
earnings changes in the year following the dividend policy change. This suggests that dividend 
changes convey information about future earnings prospects. 
 
These findings suggest that, on average, investors respond to the dividend announcements as 
if increases are good news and decreases are bad news. That is, dividend increases appear to signal 
that firms expect to have high cash flows, and should have higher stock prices. Unfortunately, these 
reactions to dividend policy changes may create perverse investment incentives that affect intrinsic 
value. By cutting investments in items that cannot be regularly seen by security analysts, firms can 
increase reported earnings and dividends, thereby increasing their stock prices. A manager’s incentive 
to temporarily boost stock prices may lead him to pass on positive NPV projects. 
 
Another problem is that investors are often unable to infer the quality of a firm’s investment 
opportunities. Thus, unanticipated changes in dividend policy can send mixed signals. If dividends are 
increased, it could be a signal that managers have run out of profitable ideas and are going to begin a 
gradual liquidation of the company. Alternatively, it may indicate that past investment decisions have 
proven to be profitable and that managers wish to credibly convey this message by promising to pay 
higher dividends. A decrease in dividends may suggest that managers need to retain capital to further 
develop investment opportunities. Alternatively, it may signal that earnings will be lower in the future 
and that manager’s cannot commit to pay relatively high dividends.  
 
The study by Lang and Litzenberger looks at this issue in an indirect fashion. They find that 
firms with high growth opportunities (as a proxy by the market-to-book ratio) have economically 
small stock price reactions to dividend announcements. By contrast, stock price reactions are much 
larger for firms with relatively poor investment opportunities. Firms with relatively poor investment 
opportunities that cut dividends experience a negative abnormal return of –2.7%, while those that 
increase dividends have a significantly positive stock reaction of 0.8%. This suggests that, for firms 
with relatively poor investment opportunities, investors like it when managers give up managerial 
discretion and punish firms that permit their managers to increase the amount of managerial discretion. 
 
Dividend Policy: Alternative Distribution Mechanisms 
 
The bottom line is that shareholders purchase stock to receive a share of a firm’s earnings.  
The typical approach is to distribute these earnings as cash dividends. In the perfect market world we 
considered earlier, investors are indifferent to receiving dividends now or later provided the firm does 
not invest excess cash in assets that dissipate wealth. Once we move away from this unrealistic setting, 
dividends do matter. Investors infer future earnings prospects from changes in payout levels. Different 
tax treatments for dividends relative capital gains also affect stock prices.  
 
One way for a corporation is to have stock repurchase plans as an alternative mechanism for 
distributing cash to shareholders. Share repurchase plans can have significant tax advantages. For the 
same payment level, dividends incur high tax liabilities because they are taxed at ordinary income 
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rates, which can be as high as 39.6%. By contrast, stock repurchase plans qualify for capital gains 
treatment. As a consequence, shareholders only pay taxes based on their capital gain rather than the 
entire payment. The portion that constitutes the investors tax basis is not taxable. Also, the maximum 
tax rate on the capital gain only is 28%.  
 
Another advantage of stock buybacks relative to dividends is that they tend to send stronger 
signals to the market. In general, dividends appear to be perceived by the stock market as regularly 
scheduled news releases conveying management’s on-going assessment of a company’s prospects. A 
stock buyback, on the other hand, is viewed as an “extra” news bulletin that is justified when 
managers feel that the stock is significantly undervalued. A stock buyback also may send a stronger 
signal to the market because it is often financed with costly external funds; in essence, management is 
“putting its money where its mouth is” with a buyback. Dividends, on the other hand, are rarely 
financed with external funds. 
 
The recent popularity of this form of distributing cash makes it worthy of examining. Total 
stock repurchase increased from $3.5 billion in 1978 to over $36 billion in 1993. The following 
companies announced potential stock buybacks of $1 billion or greater in size during 1994:  Anheuser-
Busch, McDonald’s Corp., Merck, 3M, PepsiCo, Philip Morris, and Toys “R’ US. 
 
Potential Benefits 
 
Convey Positive Information to Investors. Repurchase programs can be used to signal 
management’s belief that the stock is undervalued. Since management is typically in a better position 
to understand the company’s future prospects, investors are inclined to respond favorably to the 
announcement of a buyback program. Studies have demonstrated excess returns of 2% to 3% around 
the announcement of open-market stock repurchases with an excess return of 13% over the four years 
following the announcement.  Stock price increases of 13% to 17% are associated with exchange 
offers, while increases of 11% to 14% are associated with tender offers. 
 
Enhance Value of Investment. The idea that the firm’s stock is a good investment relates to the 
market’s undervaluation.  Since it is tempting to invest excess cash by diversifying away from the core 
business, it puts this cash in the hands of shareholders and allows them to diversify on their own.  
Such an action may have the undesired affect of signaling to investors that the firm has run out of 
profitable investment ideas. 
 
Move Toward an Optimal Capital Structure. A stock repurchase plan increases leverage. If the 
plan is financed by external borrowing, as are most plans, the impact on leverage is even greater. This 
is a simple way to move the firm closer to it is an optimal capital structure if it is under-levered. 
 
Increase Return on Equity and Earnings Per Share. A repurchase program often increases a 
company’s return on equity (ROE) and earnings per share by decreasing the number of shares 
outstanding. 
 
Acquire Shares for Stock Option, Dividend Reinvestment and Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans.  A repurchase program can be used to accumulate the shares necessary to satisfy various stock 
option, dividend reinvestment, and employee stock option programs. 
 
Enhance Management Incentives. A significant share repurchase may increase a company’s 
proportionate ownership by management and employees. This can align management and employee 
incentives more closely with those of shareholders. 
 
Investor Tax Options. When shareholders tender shares they pay capital gains taxes. While 
this is tax advantaged relative to ordinary dividends, some shareholders may prefer to avoid any tax 
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payments in the current period. Repurchase programs give shareholders the option to take cash now or 
later (by selling shares). 
 
Potential Costs 
 
Convey Negative Information to Investors. A share repurchase program may communicate that 
management has run out of profitable investments. This implies that the manner that the program is 
communicated to the investing public may have a significant impact on the way it is perceived. 
 
Dilute Cash Reserves and Deplete Debt Capacity. Since repurchase programs use excess cash 
and increase leverage, it may impair the firm’s ability to raise new capital at attractive rates. A firm 
could find its credit rating lowered. 
 
Decrease Stock’s Liquidity. Since repurchase programs remove stock, it reduces the number of 
potential traders, thereby potentially reducing liquidity. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
So after all analyses, in summary, dividend is not a simple issue in the US market. It is a 
simple process of issuance and decision-making, but it a complex consideration of how many to issue 
and why a corporation needs to issue.,Dividend policy encompasses three main factors to consider 
such as distributing or investing the excess cash flow, tax issues, and information signaling strategy.  
All these factors play a big role in the perception creation of the corporation. However, there is an 
alternative of dividend distribution mechanism through share repurchase plan. Though this way is 
rather tad costly, but with a proper planning, share repurchase plan’s benefits outweighs the 
drawbacks. A proper planning of share repurchase plan can be another huge issue of discussion. At the 
end, investors purchase stock to receive a share of a firm’s earnings, which is normally distributed 
through dividends; however, investors may have different perspective of investing and earning 
purposes which could be through an expectation of capital gain. As a result, to maintain a strong 
fundamental of enterprise value, dividend policy becomes a critical function that needs to be managed 
accordingly.   
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